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BROADBAND APPLICATIONS TO E-HEALTH: (C) INFORMATION
Jennifer Heath
University of Wollongong
Aspects of the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act (HIA) are compared to the Australian Law 
Reform  Commission  (ALRC)  Unified  Privacy  Principles.  The  opportunity  for  improved 
healthcare delivery through the enabling healthcare identifiers is acknowledged and discussion 
moves  beyond  such  justifications  to  consideration  of  broader  implications  for  Australian 
society. Law Academic Roger Magnusson’s three broad, sequential conceptual shifts in health 
privacy provide a framework for the discussion. Lost opportunities for Australian consumers 
are also highlighted.
 
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of electronic health records (EHR) has proven to be a challenge in Australia, 
as  it  has  elsewhere in  the  world (Kalra  2006;  Baird et  al  2011;  Gunter  and Terry 2005; 
Hayrinen et al 2008; Ludwick et al 2010). Healthcare professionals strongly argue the case for 
EHR in terms of the benefits to both individual healthcare consumers and society as a whole. 
(National  Electronic  Health  Records  Taskforce  2000)  An  important  step  towards  the 
introduction of the Australian EHR was undertaken in 2010 with the passing of the Healthcare 
Identifiers Act (HIA) through the Australian Parliament.
In parallel to the above developments in the health care sector the Australian Law Reform 
Commission  (ALRC)  has  wrestled  with  the  concept  of  privacy  in  the  Information  Age. 
Following  extensive  consultation  with  community  members,  policy  and  law  makers  the 
ALRC proposed a  set  of  eleven Unified Privacy Principles  (UPPs)  for Australia.  (ALRC 
2008) The main objective was to unify and enhance the provision of the Commonwealth 
sector  Information  Privacy  Principles  (IPPs)  and  the  private  sector  National  Privacy 
Principles (NPPs). 
The UPPs moved through consultation to become the final thirteen exposure draft Australian 
Privacy Principles (APPs). Health related provisions that were previously covered by IPPs 
and NPPs are, however, not covered by the APPs. The  Healthcare identifiers and privacy:  
Discussion  paper  on  proposals  for  legislative  support (2009)  referred  to  the  UPPs  and 
included them as an appendix. Table 1 provides a timeline to illustrate the parallel journey 
these two important national endeavours have taken over the last few years. 
The release of the Exposure Australian Privacy Principles came 11 months after the release 
of the healthcare identifiers and privacy discussion paper. The Healthcare Identifiers Act was  
finalised in the month following release of the exposure APPs. The Australian Government is  
yet to release law reform proposals to deal with specific privacy protections for information 
relating to health. (Companion Guide to APPs 2010, 4)
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CONSUMERS, ALRC PRIVACY PRINCIPLES AND 
THE 2010 HEALTHCARE IDENTIFIERS ACT
As the APPs have not yet been finalised, and given that the UPPs did not aim to exclude  
health care provisions and they were used in the healthcare identifiers discussion paper, they 
are used in this paper to facilitate discussion. 
Published Document
May 2008 Australian Law Reform Commission Model Unified Privacy Principles.
July 2009 Healthcare identifiers and privacy: Discussion paper on proposals for legislative support.
June 2010 Exposure Australian Privacy Principles + Companion Guide to Australian Privacy Principles.
July 2010
Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010.
Draft released for comment: in mid Dec 2009, Submissions closed: 7 
Jan 2010.
Due July 
2011 Senate Committee report on Exposure Australian Privacy Principles.
Table 1 - Influential documents in two parallel activities with national importance: ALRC Privacy and health sector 
identifiers.
In contrast to the Australian approach the US Government reserved support for a unique,  
national  health  identifier  until  Congress  had enacted  comprehensive legislation to  protect 
consumer privacy. (Ng 2000) 
This paper highlights several tension points regarding privacy in these Australian national 
endeavours. It  moves the discussion beyond the EHR objectives to consider Magnusson’s  
“mother of all function creeps” and broader societal impacts.
MAGNUSSON’S 3 CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS IN HEALTH 
PRIVACY
Roger  Magnusson  argues  that  the  challenges  to  health  information  privacy  are  best 
understood by considering three very broad, sequential conceptual shifts from a relationship 
between a single clinician and a patient, to more complex scenarios with multiple clinicians 
(Magnusson 2004). The essential components of the health information privacy transitions 
perceived by Magnusson are summarised below.
CONCEPT 1: PATIENT-CENTRED HEALTH RECORDS 
Clinical  care  is  delivered  by  a  sole  practitioner  who  receives  or  generates  sensitive  
information during the care of a patient/consumer. Information is stored on hardcopy health 
records.  Protection  of  confidentiality  within  the  bilateral  doctor/patient  relationship  is 
paramount.  The  hardcopy  nature  of  the  health  record  aids  in  restricting  access  to  the  
consumer’s  information.  The  clinician  consults  with  the  patient  in  the  ‘gatekeeper’  role, 
seeking consent where necessary to release records for secondary purposes, meaning those 
purposes that do not pertain to the direct delivery of healthcare to an individual. (Safran et al. 
2006)
Within this paradigm, the law focuses on offering consumers protection by imposing penalties 
on the doctor for unauthorised disclosure of personal information.
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CONCEPT 2: MULTI-FUNCTION HEALTH DATA HOLDINGS
Clinical care is typically delivered in a “corporate” environment including hospitals, medical  
centres  and  community-based  practice  groups.  Patient  information  is  recorded  in  a 
centralised, shared record which can be accessed by a range of clinicians and administrators.  
The need for specialised and efficient care results in many team members widely accessing 
the individual’s health record. In institutional contexts the treating physician does not broker  
access to patient records. There will rarely be a single ‘gatekeeper’ allowing access.
Within  this  paradigm,  the  focus  of  the  law  shifts  from  protecting  confidentiality  in  a  
relationship to protecting the actual medical information.
On the shift from bilateral to multilateral confidentiality Magnusson states:
‘The growth of computers and the revolution in information technology has made 
this transition inevitable. Privacy legislation goes beyond confidentiality to regulate 
other  elements  of  the  “information  processing  cycle”;  namely  the  collection  of 
personal information, its accuracy, security and storage; the right of the subject to 
access it, as well as use and disclosure’ (Magnusson 2004, 683)
CONCEPT 3: TRANS-ORGANISATIONAL HEALTH DATA FLOWS
Patient health records are stored in electronic health records in a manner to facilitate national  
linkage  and  potentially  more  surveillance.  Management  of  privacy  extends  beyond  one 
organisation’s  health  care  environment.  In  Australia  this  includes  the  national  health 
insurance scheme,  Medicare,  General  Practitioners and Super-Clinics,  prescriptions details  
held in the Pharmaceutical Benefits System, private health insurance organisations, public and 
private hospitals and allied health agencies. 
The argument for electronic health records, which characterise Magnusson’s third conceptual 
shift,  is  usually  pitched in  terms  of  improved  health  care  outcomes  for  individuals.  The 
benefit to the government is the way health information networks enable the monitoring and 
measurement of the national health system performance. 
On the matter of secondary uses of medical data Magnusson is very clear. Under the initial  
patient-centred model the use of a patient’s health information for secondary purposes can be 
considered  extraordinary.  His  prediction  for  the  future  direction  of  secondary  uses  is 
foreboding for privacy advocates:
‘The  mother  of  all  “function  creeps”,  but  only  likely  to  become  increasingly 
apparent over the next decade or so is the gradual absorption of patients’ health  
records within a broader public health infrastructure whose goals explicitly include 
the protection and promotion of population health’. (Magnusson 2004, 686)
In  this  final  trans-organisational  concept  Magnusson  anticipates  strong  pressure  for  a 
surveillance  architecture  permitting  linkages  between  health  systems,  environmental, 
demographic  and  socio-economic  surveillance  data  –  thus  truly  achieving  the  Orwellian 
future feared by privacy advocates. The broader, more recent research of M.G. and Katina 
Michael (Michael and Michael 2010) reflects on the need to carefully consider the adoption of 
new technologies and perhaps “ ... reject its rampant application and diffusion without studied 
consideration as to the potential  effects and consequences.”  The notions of Uberveillance 
posited by M.G. and Katina Michael resonate with the future envisioned by Magnusson.
CURRENT AUSTRALIAN POSITION
The HIA is moving Australian society towards Magnusson’s third conceptual shift of Trans-
Organisational Health Data Flows. Writing in 2004, Magnusson anticipated that it would take 
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almost a decade to see evidence of the conceptual shifts. To date discussions and justifications 
for creation of healthcare identifiers and EHR have largely focussed on the potential, positive  
aspects associated with improved health care. Adopting a broader view Magnusson draws our  
attention to uses beyond direct healthcare, including performance monitoring by governments. 
The notion of monitoring Australian health system performance is currently under debate in 
the Medical Journal of Australia (Braithwaite and Mannion 2011; Jorm and Frommer 2011). 
Individual  and  Provider  Identifiers  are  fundamental  building  blocks  of  the  information 
systems that provide the vast volumes of data needed for corporate and trans-organisational 
and national performance monitoring.
The next section of this paper compares and contrasts the Identifier Principle of the ALRC 
UPPs and the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act. This enables a multi-dimensional perspective 
to allow reflection on both the immediate EHR drivers and broader societal impact.
IDENTIFIERS - ALRC PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
In  developing the proposed UPPs,  the  ALRC considered many aspects  of  privacy in  the 
Australian  context  including:  the  background  to  privacy  regulation;  achieving  national 
consistency; regulating privacy; impacts of developing technology on privacy and associated 
matters. ALRC Recommendation 30.3, clarifies the term ‘Identifier’:
‘The ‘Identifiers’ principle should define ‘identifier’ inclusively to mean a number, 
symbol  or  biometric  information  that  is  collected  for  the  purpose  of  automated 
biometric identification or verification that:
(a) uniquely identifies or verifies the identity of an individual for the purpose of 
an agency’s operations; or
(b) is determined to be an identifier by the Privacy Commissioner’
On the issue of the Identifiers Principle the ALRC states 
‘It is not desirable for organisations to refer to individuals by an identifier that is  
assigned  by  an  agency,  nor  is  it  desirable  to  facilitate  data-matching  between 
agencies and organisations through the use of an identifier’. (ALRC 2008, Vol2, 
1029)
It is clear here that the ALRC is warning that organisations should not be allowed to adopt 
unique,  individual  identifiers that  have been allocated by Government  agencies.  Allowing 
numerous organisations to adopt the same Government generated unique, individual identifier 
enables data from disparate organisations information systems to be readily linked. The level  
of individual surveillance and secondary data use that is possible with such architectures is for 
many members of society quite alarming – hence the ALRC strong position here.
The development of national identity numbers is not a notion endorsed in any way by the  
ALRC, published discussion specifically refers to preventing the creation of de facto national  
identifiers:
‘The  policy  objectives  underlying  the  recommended  ‘Identifiers’  principle— 
preventing an identifier that is assigned by an agency from becoming a de facto 
national identity number, and restricting the use of an identifier to facilitate data  
matching programs—are also relevant to the handling of identifiers by agencies’.  
(ALRC 2008, 1034)
The Australian Privacy Commissioner provided a concise description of the importance of  
identifiers in a submission to the ALRC,
‘The privacy risks of sharing unique identifiers are not always immediate. The risks 
accumulate as  more  organisations  or  agencies  adopt  the  number  for  their  own 
purposes,  and  as  greater amounts of  otherwise  unrelated  personal  information 
become associated with that number. Accordingly,  individuals may not always be 
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conscious of the inherent risks of consenting to incrementally greater uses of their 
unique identifier’. (ALRC 2008, Vol2, 1047)
Moving on from the UPPs the Companion Guide to the Australian Privacy Principles (2010) 
provides very clear guidance on the use of identifiers issued by government  agencies via 
Australian Privacy Principle 9 – adoption, use or disclosure of government related identifier:
‘This principle is aimed at ensuring that organisations (not agencies) do not refer to 
individuals  within  their  own  systems  according  to  identifiers  (for  example, 
Medicare  numbers)  issued  by  government  agencies.  Further,  it  prevents  the 
facilitation of unlawful data-matching by organisations through use and disclosure 
of such identifiers. 
The key goal  of  this  principle  is  to  restrict  general  use  of  identifiers  issued by 
government agencies and prevent such identifiers from becoming de facto national  
identity numbers’. (Companion Guide APPs 2010, 11)
The substantial consultation undertaken by the ALRC in the development of the Model UPPs 
and  subsequent  progress  to  Exposure  Australian  Privacy  Principles  indicates  a  real 
engagement  with the issue of privacy in the Information Age. There is a recognition that 
adoption of information and communication technologies is not always in the best interests of 
individuals as they inevitably leave electronic footprints through their day-to-day activities. 
The notion of undesirable citizen surveillance is acknowledged by the ALRC and prevention 
of such is a clear objective throughout its three-volume report (ALRC 2008) and Exposure 
Australian Privacy Principle 9.
IDENTIFIERS - 2010 HEALTHCARE IDENTIFIERS ACT
The  Healthcare  identifiers  and  privacy:  Discussion  paper  on  proposals  for  legislative  
support was issued by the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council in July 2009. This 
paper described legislative proposals to support the creation and implementation of Australian 
national healthcare identifiers and associated arrangements for privacy of health information.  
Included in this proposal is the creation of an Individual Healthcare Identifier (IHI) for every 
Australian.
The  Discussion  Paper  puts  forward  the  case  for  establishment  of  the  national  healthcare 
identifiers with the associated Health Identifier Service expected to be operational by mid  
2010. As noted in the Executive Summary to the Discussion Paper:
 “Discussions  between  governments  about  a  national  privacy  framework  across  all  
jurisdictions and its implementation may not be completed by that time”. (Discussion Paper 
2009, 3) This is a lost opportunity for consumers as a stable, well established national privacy 
framework would have been advantageous for consumers both now and in the future as the 
identifiers are more widely adopted.
The Discussion Paper stated that “assignment of IHIs will be authorised by legislation and  
individual consent will not be sought”.  (Discussion Paper 2009, 25) The arguments for this 
are sound from an information systems point of view, that is from the outset the health data 
management  goals  would  be  best  served  by a  complete,  valid  and comprehensive  set  of 
individual identifiers. Assigning health care identifiers on a voluntary basis is rejected in the 
Discussion Paper as it “...would create numerous implementation problems and complexities,  
placing increased burden on  healthcare providers  and consumers,  and resulting in  poor  
uptake”. (Discussion Paper 2009, 11)  Authors of the Discussion Paper go on to state that 
“Limited or inconsistent uptake will mean that many of the efficiency gains for health care  
providers  and  important  quality  and  safety  benefits  for  patients  will  not  be  realised.” 
(Discussion Paper 2009, 11)
This approach can be seen as very ‘heavy-handed’ and somewhat paternalistic and an ‘opt-
out’ option for Australian consumers who did not wish to participate in the de facto national  
identifiers could also have been supported from a privacy-protective perspective. Arguments 
against the failed Australia Card are pertinent here but will not be revisited in this paper.
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The Discussion Paper also explains that healthcare providers will be given approval to adopt  
the new Individual Healthcare Identifiers in their health information systems. This suggestion 
is in  direct conflict with the ALRC policy objective, UPP 10 and APP 9 that prevents the 
adoption of such identifiers due to concern regarding data linkage and the future potential for 
surveillance. This is also in  direct conflict with the risks raised by the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner, as presented above, where the issues with shared identifier use are not initially 
obvious but become more apparent over time with broader adoption by a growing number of 
organisations. 
The Discussion Paper also acknowledges that this aspect of the Healthcare Identifier proposal 
is at odds with the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988:
‘Specific authority will be given to private sector healthcare provider organisations 
to adopt, use or disclose and IHI or HPI-I for health information management and 
communication  purposes.  This  is  to  overcome  a  restriction  in  the  present 
Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988’. (Discussion Paper 2009, 3).
The draft Exposure Healthcare Identifiers Bill was available for scrutiny and comment across 
the  Christmas-New  Year  period  from  mid-December  2009  to  7  Jan  2010.  The  brief 
consultation across the traditional holiday period was not ideal for consumer engagement. The 
2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act was enacted in July 2010 with all Australians allocated a 16 
digit unique identifier. 
Within  the  HIA,  Division  3 Section  25  Adoption  by  healthcare,  authorises  healthcare 
providers to use the national identifier within their own information systems:
25 Adoption by healthcare provider
A healthcare provider is authorised to adopt the healthcare identifier of a healthcare  
recipient (including a healthcare identifier disclosed to the healthcare provider for 
any purpose under section 24) as the healthcare provider’s own identifier  of the 
healthcare recipient.
Using  this  de  facto  national  identifier  as  a  possible  primary  key  or  foreign  key  within 
healthcare provider’s disparate information systems could at a later date readily facilitate data 
linkage and surveillance. The impact of this on future Australian society is alarming yet this 
legislation has passed fairly quietly through Federal Parliament.
There is a note in the legislation attached to this section that states that this approval only 
relates  to  the  identifier  not  the  associated  consumer  personal  health  information.  The 
associated health information is to be dealt with by ‘other’ legislation including the Privacy  
Act 1988.  When using information technology it is the identifier that is needed for linkage 
and it is somewhat inadequate to refer back to the Privacy Act 1988 seeking protection for the 
remainder of the held personal information. Australian researchers have recently noted the 
complexity in navigating privacy legislation (O’Keefe and Connolly 2010) and this splitting 
of the individual healthcare identifier and the associated medical information between two (or 
more) Acts may not assist.
As  Magnusson foreshadowed in Concept  3,  the  gradual  absorption of  individual’s  health 
records  within  a  broader  public  health  infrastructure  is  evident  in  the  HIA.  Specifically,  
Section 24 Use and disclosure for other purposes authorises release of health identifiers for a 
range of secondary purposes including but not limited to: management, funding, monitoring 
or evaluation of healthcare; provision of indemnity cover for a healthcare provider; conduct of 
research that has been approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee and to lessen or  
prevent  serious  threats to  public  health.  Clearly the healthcare identifiers  alone would be 
insufficient to facilitate such secondary uses and the associated personal and medical data is  
also required.
Within Section 24 the HIA is strengthened by the inclusion of four excluded secondary uses:
Certain purposes excluded
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This section does not authorise the use or disclosure of the healthcare identifier of a 
healthcare  recipient  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  or  managing  health 
information as part of:
(a) underwriting a contract of insurance that covers the healthcare recipient; or
(b)  determining  whether  to  enter  into a contract  of  insurance that  covers the  
healthcare recipient (whether alone or as a member of a class); or
(c) determining whether a contract of insurance covers the healthcare recipient in 
relation to a particular event; or
(d) employing the healthcare recipient.
The exclusion of these secondary purposes reflects Australian consumers concerns regarding 
secondary use of medical data by insurance organisations and employers as gathered by a 
pilot consumer survey in 2009. (Heath 2010)
CONCLUSIONS
By looking beyond the healthcare drivers that led to the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act, it is  
possible to recognise that there are broader societal impacts that, as the Privacy Commissioner 
and Magnusson have warned, are not always immediately apparent. Ideally the Australian 
Privacy Principles (APP) would have been finalised and supported by legislation prior to  
tackling the complex issue of creation of Australian Healthcare Identifiers. 
Looking  to  the  future  we  can  expect  increased  interest  in  secondary  uses  of  Australian 
consumers medical data as the adoption of the IHI facilitates linkage of disparate datasets.  
Secondary uses include: commercial activities such as those offered by data brokers; medical 
research;  clinical  audit  and  healthcare  administration.  Research  is  currently  underway  to 
explore Australian consumer’s  expectations regarding secondary use of their medical  data 
(Heath 2010). The outcomes of this research should assist by providing consumers voices in 
upcoming Government initiatives concerning eHealth and privacy.
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